Crisis of Conscience Page 16
The administration was not in favor of publishing the new position in print since the old position had never been put in print but only conveyed to the particular individuals inquiring. To publish something would require first explaining what the old position had been and then explaining that it was now obsolete. This did not seem desirable. So the staff workers made a diligent search through their files to try to find the names and addresses of all those persons who had written inquiries and another letter was sent to each advising of the change. The staff workers felt better about this.
Then they realized that many of the inquiries had come in by phone and that they had no record of such phone calls and absolutely no way of determining who such inquiring hemophiliacs were. Whether, in the interim between the old ruling and the new, some had died, they did not know; whether some whom they had not been able to contact would yet die because of holding to the old ruling, they did not know. They only knew that they had followed instructions, being loyally obedient to their superiors in the organization.
This change in policy was made official at the June 11, 1975, session of the Governing Body. It was not until three years later, in 1978, however, that the change was finally put into print, though rather obscurely stated and, strangely, listed in with the issue of the use of serum injections to combat disease (whereas hemophilia is not a disease but a hereditary defect), in the June 15, 1978, issue of the Watchtower. It still was not acknowledged that this represented a change in the previous policy as to multiple use of blood fractions by hemophiliacs.
Another clue to the thinking of Governing Body members in such cases was the emphasis often placed on the long-standing nature of a particular policy. This meant that through the years thousands had abided by the Society’s policy even though it created a severe burden for them, perhaps leading to imprisonment or other suffering. To change now, it was argued, might make such ones feel that what they had undergone had been unnecessary and, whereas they had found personal satisfaction in suffering in such way, viewing it as ‘suffering for righteousness sake,’ now they might feel disillusioned, possibly even feel it unfair that they had endured a form of martyrdom while others now could escape such.
I found that potential attitude a poor reason for holding back on making a change where there was sound evidence in favor of it. It seemed that such ones who had suffered could rejoice in knowing that others would not be called upon to undergo that burden in order to stay in good standing in the organization. If, as an illustration, an individual had lost a farm due to heavy—even unjust—taxation, should he not rejoice on behalf of friends, faced with a similar loss, if he learned that the heavy tax was lifted? Should not a coal miner suffering with a lung ailment be happy if conditions in mines improved, even though he could no longer benefit from this? It seemed that a genuine Christian would. Particularly so if the source of the unjust policy accepted its responsibility and expressed regret for harm done. It appeared to me that we needed to ask ourselves how much of the concern expressed might not actually be traceable to a concern over the Governing Body’s own “image,” its credibility, and its hold on people’s confidence, being affected by fear that admitting error could weaken this.
Listening to some of the arguments presented in the Governing Body sessions brought to mind the many cases that Jehovah’s Witnesses had carried before the Supreme Court of the United States. Opposing lawyers had used arguments similar in many respects to those used by men on the Governing Body. Such lawyers stressed potential dangers. They claimed that there was a strong danger that door-to-door visitation might become a serious nuisance or a blind for thievery and other criminal activity and that this justified placing restrictions on the Witnesses’ freedom to carry on this activity. They said that to allow the Witnesses freedom to carry on their public activity or to give talks in parks in certain communities could lead to mob violence, due to the adverse and hostile attitude of the community as a whole, and therefore that restrictions should be placed. They argued that to allow the Witnesses to express their views on such subjects as saluting the flag, or their attitude toward worldly governments as being “part of the Devil’s organization,” could be detrimental to the interests of the larger community, could tend to create widespread disloyalty, hence be seditious; restrictions were necessary.
The Supreme Court justices in many cases showed remarkable insight and clarity of mind in cutting through such arguments, demonstrating them to be specious. They did not agree that the rights of the individual or of a small unpopular minority could properly be curtailed just because the fear of possible or imagined danger or because the claimed interests of the larger majority made this appear desirable. They held that before any rightful restriction could be applied limiting such freedoms, the danger must be more than a “fear,” something presumed to be likely to develop. It must be proven a “clear and present danger,” one actually existing9
How many favorable decisions would the Witnesses have received if the Supreme Court justices had not shown such judicious wisdom, such ability to see where the real issue lay, such concern for the individual? Their decisions were applauded in the Society’s publications. Sadly, however, the high standards of judgment and the approach to emotionally charged issues shown by these judges often appeared to be on a higher level than that manifested in many Governing Body sessions. The expression of one Supreme Court justice in a particular Witness case comes to mind. He stated:
The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intelligently and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. . . . freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.10
The confidence that the justice expressed in the ‘existing social order’ and the freedoms it espoused seemed considerably greater than the confidence expressed by some Governing Body members in their fellow Witnesses and the effect their freedom of conscience, if exercised, could have on the existing “Theocratic order.” If the Supreme Court justices had reasoned as some of the Governing Body members reasoned, the Witnesses would likely have lost case after case.
Court decisions are judged by history. The Scriptural declaration that, on a day certain to come, each Christian elder will “render an account” to the Supreme Judge regarding his dealings with, and treatment of, God’s sheep, should surely give those exercising great authority among Christians a serious reason for weighing carefully what they do.11
The way in which recent major changes of policy have been presented in the organization’s official publications demonstrates that concern over the effect of the change indeed has not been so much for the individuals who had suffered needlessly but concern for the “image” of the organization as God’s channel and of the Governing Body as a body of divinely appointed and divinely guided administrators. Perhaps the most striking example of this is with regard to the major change as to acceptance of “alternative service.”
“Alternative service” describes civil service (such as hospital work or other forms of community service) offered by a government as an alternative for those who conscientiously object to participation in compulsory military service. Many enlightened countries offer this alternative to such ones among their citizens. What developed within the Witness organization and its Governing Body in this connection is of particular interest in view of a policy change in 1996.
The official position of the Watch Tower Society, developed in the early 1940s during the Second World War, was that if one of Jehovah’s Witnesses accepted such alternative service he had “compromised,” had broken integrity with God. The reasoning behind this was that because this service was a “substitute” it therefore took the place of what it substituted for and (so the r
easoning apparently went) came to stand for the same thing.12 Since it was offered in place of military service and since military service involved (potentially at least) the shedding of blood, then anyone accepting the substitute became “bloodguilty.” This remarkable policy developed before the Governing Body became a genuine reality and was evidently decided upon by Fred Franz and Nathan Knorr during the period when they produced all major policy decisions. Failure to adhere to this policy would mean being viewed automatically as “disassociated” and being treated the same as if disfellowshipped.
The May 1, 1996, Watchtower reversed this policy. In an article titled “Paying Back Caesar’s Things to Caesar,” the paragraphs shown in Appendix A (for Chapter 5) appeared. These gave the readers none of the history of the policy that had existed up to this point, a policy that had been in effect for more than 50 years. Similarly, they told the readers nothing of what had taken place within the Governing Body some two decades earlier regarding this same policy. Perhaps nothing illustrates so forcefully the effect of the “two-thirds majority” voting rule on people’s lives as does that information. Consider:
It was over thirty years ago, in November 1977, that a letter arrived in Brooklyn from a Witness in Belgium, Michel Weber, questioning the reasoning on which this organizational policy was based. See the following page for some of the points his letter raised:
This led to the alternative service issue being dealt with by the Governing Body in a number of lengthy and intense discussions, first on January 28,1978, then on March 1, and again on September 26, October 11, October 18 and November 15. A worldwide survey was made and letters were received from some 90 branch offices.
As documentation shows, many Branch office committees, including those from several major countries, indicated that the Witness men affected did not understand either the logic or the Scripturalness of the organization’s position. In a number of cases the Branch committees themselves raised questions as to the rightness of the policy and presented Scriptural reasons for allowing the matter to be one of conscience. The Branch Committee in Belgium, the country from which Michel Weber’s letter originated, made this expression:
The letter from the Belgian Branch committee, signed by the Branch Coordinator, makes clear to what it was that “loyalty” was being shown. It recounts the committee’s efforts loyally to uphold organizational policy. It also shows that it was not a case of “loyally upholding Christian principles as they understood them,” nor of “responding to the proddings of conscience” that caused the young men to reject alternative service and thereafter be imprisoned for two years. The truth is that “few,” in fact “very few” of the brothers affected could explain with the Bible the basis for that policy. The letter states that nonetheless they refused alternative service because “they knew it was wrong and that the Society views it as such.” Since they could not explain it Scripturally, their ‘knowing it was wrong’ can actually mean only that for them whatever the Society in Brooklyn said determined the rightness or wrongness of the matter—not what the Scriptures themselves said. They suffered two years imprisonment, not because of a decision based on personal conscience and personal conviction, but because of adherence to a humanly originated ordinance.
The Branch Committee in Canada clearly indicated that they did not believe the then-current Watch Tower position was truly explainable from the standpoint of logic or Scripture. Discussing the problems on justifying that position both to governmental authorities and to the young Witness men affected by it, they wrote:
The Branch in Spain wrote a five-page letter.
These are some of the points raised in their letter:
I personally had already presented to the Body some fourteen pages of historical, Scriptural and lexicographical evidence pointing in the same direction (See Appendix A “For Chapter 5”). Consider, then, what took place in the last three of the six Governing Body sessions referred to:
At the October 11, 1978, meeting, of thirteen members present, nine voted in favor of changing the traditional policy so that the decision to accept or reject alternative service would be left to the conscience of the individual; four did not vote for this. The result? Since there were then sixteen members in the Body (though not all were present) and since nine was not two-thirds of sixteen, no change was made.
On October 18 there was discussion on the subject but no vote taken. On November 15, all sixteen members were present and eleven voted for changing the policy so that the Witness who conscientiously felt he could accept such service would not be automatically categorized as unfaithful to God and disassociated from the congregation. This was a two-thirds majority. Was the change made?
No, for after a brief intermission, Governing Body member Lloyd Barry, who had voted with the majority in favor of a change, announced that he had changed his mind and would vote for continuance of the traditional policy. That destroyed the two-thirds majority. A subsequent vote taken, with fifteen members present, showed nine favoring a change, five against and one abstention.14
Six sessions of the Governing Body had discussed the issue and, when votes were taken, in every case a majority of the Governing Body members had favored removal of the existing policy. The one vote with the two-thirds majority lasted less than one hour and the policy remained in force. As a result Witness men were still expected to risk imprisonment rather than accept alternative service—even though, as the letters coming in from the survey showed, they might conscientiously feel such acceptance was proper in God’s sight. Incredible as it may seem, this was the position taken, and most members of the Body appeared to accept it all as nothing to be disturbed about. They were, after all, simply following the rules in force.
A year later, on September 15, 1979, another vote was taken and it was evenly divided, half for a change, half against.
For another 16 years the policy remained in effect, until the May 1, 1996 Watchtower abruptly decreed that acceptance of alternative service was now a matter of conscience. During those 16 years, thousands of Witnesses, mainly young men, spent time in prison for refusing to accept assignments to perform various forms of community service as an alternative to military service. As late as 1988, a report by Amnesty International stated that in France, “More than 500 conscientious objectors to military service, the vast majority of them Jehovah’s Witnesses, were imprisoned during the year.” For the same year, in Italy, “Approximately 1,000 conscientious objectors, mostly Jehovah’s Witnesses, were reported to be imprisoned in 10 military prisons for refusing to perform military service or the alternative civilian service.”15
That is just a partial picture. If that one Governing Body member had not changed his vote in 1978, virtually none of these men would have gone to prison—for the branch office committees’ reports give clear evidence that it was not the personal, individual consciences of these young men that produced the imprisonment. It was the compulsion to adhere to an organizationally imposed policy.
The policy change is unquestionably welcome. Nonetheless, the fact that it took some 50 years for the organization’s to finally remove itself from this area of personal conscience surely has significance. One cannot but think of all the thousands of years collectively lost during half a century by Witness men as to their freedom to associate with family and friends, or to contribute to their own economy and the economy of those related to them, or pursue other worthwhile activities in ways not possible within prison walls. It represents an incredible waste of valuable years for the simple reason that it was unnecessary, being the result of an unscriptural position, imposed by organizational authority.
Had there been a frank acknowledgment of error, not merely doctrinal error, but error in wrongfully invading the right of conscience of others, and of regret over the harmful consequences of that intrusion, one might find reason for sincere commendation, even reason for hope of some measure of fundamental reform. Regrettably, the May 1, 1996 Watchtower nowhere deals with these factors and contains not eve
n a hint of regret for the effects of the wrong position enforced for over half a century. It does not even offer any explanation as to why the mistaken policy was rigidly insisted upon for over fifty years. In a couple of sentences it makes the change, doing so as if by edict, one that in effect says, “Your conscience may now be operative in this area.”
In place of apology, the organization instead seems to feel it deserves applause for having made changes it should have had the good sense (and humility) to have made decades earlier, changes that were resisted in the face of ample evidence presented from the Scriptures, both from within the Body and from Branch Office committees. Some of these Branch committees presented not only all the Scriptural evidence found in the May 1, 1996 Watchtower, but even more extensive and more carefully reasoned Scriptural evidence. They did this back in 1978 but what they wrote was, in effect, shrugged off or discounted by those of the Governing Body who held out for maintaining the traditional policy then in place.
Paragraph 17 of the article, for example, points out that “compulsory service was practiced in Bible times” and contains a brief quotation from a history book that describes the “corvée” labor under Roman rule and the example of Simon of Cyrene being compelled to carry Jesus’ cross. The memorandum I submitted to the Governing Body 18 years before (in 1978) contained fourteen pages of evidence of this identical evidence, as also extensive documentation of the fact that the Biblical term for “tax” (Hebrew mas; Greek phoros) was commonly used to describe payment in the form of compulsory service. (See Appendix A.) The major Biblical texts cited in the 1996 Watchtower in support of viewing compulsory service as acceptable, such as Matthew 5:41; 27:32; 1 Peter 2:13; Titus 3:1, 2, are all found (along with numerous other texts) not only in the memorandum I had provided but also in many of the letters written by branch committees whose members reasoned that alternative service had Biblical acceptance. The Scriptural evidence had thus been presented back in 1978 but was simply not given weight by those Governing Body members voting against any change in policy. For 18 years the traditional position continued to receive greater consideration.